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Earl: Criminal Law: Crowded
Dockets No Longer Justify Denial of Speedy
COMMENTS
indistinguishable persons based solely on a period of residency. Second, the
first steps may have been taken toward the establishment of a uniform
welfare program in the United States so that indigent persons may more
easily remove their stigma of "second-class citizenship" and enjoy certain
benefits that were previously unattainable.
BRUCE H. BOKOR

CRIMINAL LAW: CROWDED DOCKETS NO LONGER
JUSTIFY DENIAL OF SPEEDY TRIAL
State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, 238 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1970)*
Pursuant to Florida's "speedy trial" statute,' petitioner filed demand for
trial during each of three successive terms of court. Petitioner's motion for
discharge, made at the conclusion of three full terms of court without trial,
was rejected by the trial court. The Third District Court of Appeals denied
a writ of prohibition, ruling that the petitioner had not been denied a
speedy trial. 2 The district court based its decision on the fact that crowded
dockets had forced postponement of the case and that petitioner had acquiesced in the delay by agreeing to a motion hearing during the third term of
court. On certiorari, 3 the Supreme Court of Florida reversed and HELD, delays emanating from crowded dockets do not toll the speedy trial statute.4
The court ruled for the petitioner notwithstanding his consent to a motion
hearing in the third term of court and the fact that the timing of petitioner's
*EDrroR's NoTa: After this case, Florida's speedy trial statutes were amended (FLA. STAT.

§§915.01, .02 (Supp. 1970)) and subsequently repealed. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-1 (B) §7. An
interim rule has been adopted by the Florida supreme court. FLA. R. CiUm. P. 1.191, 245
So.

2d

33 (Fla. 1971). This comment is pertinent to the possible content and effect of a

permanent rule.
1.

Fla. Stat. §915.01(2) (1969) provided in part: "When a person has been arrested and

released on bond, and thereafter for three successive terms of court, files a written demand
for trial . . . and . . . is not brought to trial at or before the third full term after the
date he is first committed, he shall be forever discharged ...

2. 229 So. 2d 595 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
3. Petitioner's writ of certiorari was based on conflict jurisdiction. The
conflict between the lower court's holding and the holdings in State ex
Edwards, 233 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1970); Anderson v. Edwards, 234 So. 2d 720
1970), cert. denied, 238 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1970); Clark v. Edwards, 234 So. 2d
Fla. 1970).
4.

petition alleged
rel. Johnson v.
(4th D.C.A. Fla.
399 (4th D.C.A.

238 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1970).
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demands for trial minimized the possibility of alerting the prosecuting
attorney of the petitioner's right to be discharged. 5 The decision of the district
court was quashed with instructions to discharge the petitioner, Justices
Roberts, Drew, and Thornal dissenting.
First enunciated in the Magna Carta,6 the right of an accused to a speedy
trial is guaranteed by both the United States7 and Florida" constitutions. The
right affords concrete benefits to both the accused and to society.9 A speedy
trial enables the accused to avoid the "legal limbo" and uncertainty attending
unproved criminal charges' 0 and the chilling effect of such charges on his
associations, speech, and employment. 1" The interests of society are protected
since prompt trial lessens the opportunity for an accused to flee or commit
13
additional crimes,' 2 and enhances the deterrent value of convictions. Both
the accused and the state benefit by avoiding difficulties resulting from
4
stale evidence and the possible loss of witnesses.
Despite its merits, the scope and limitations of the right are far from
dear. 5 The United States Supreme Court has seldom considered the issue'
and has only recently held the sixth amendment right applicable to the
states.' 7 Consequently, the right to a speedy trial has largely been defined by
lower federal', and state courts.' 9
Prior to repeal of the "speedy trial" statute, Florida implemented the con5. Petitioner's first demand for trial came on the last day (Aug. 12, 1968) of the term
in which he was arrested and released on bond. The second demand came on the first day
of the next term (Aug. 13, 1968). The final demand was fied on the last day of the subsequent term (Dec. 9, 1968). Petitioner then remained silent during the next term until
the final day of that term when his motion for discharge was filed (Feb. 10, 1969). 238 So.

2d 281, 282 (Fla. 1970).
6. MAGNA CARTA c. 40 (1215): "To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay
right or justice."
7. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI: "In all eriminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial...."
8. FLA. CONsr. art. I, §16. Six states (Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New York, North Carolina) have no constitutional provisions guaranteeing a speedy trial.
See Note, infra note 14, at 847 n.7.
9. See McCray v. State, 181 So. 2d 729 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966) (individual's rights must
be safeguarded but society has the right to a speedy trial of those transgressing its laws).
10. Gosset v. Hanlon, 195 So. 2d 865, 868 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
11. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967).
12. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 42 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
13. Id.
14. Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. Rnv. 846 (1957).

15. ABA STANDARDS RLATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL 2 (Approved Draft 1968).
16. To date, the Court has considered the right to a speedy trial only five times:
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967);
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966); Pollard v. United States 352 US. 354 (1957);
Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905). For a discussion of the Court's neglect of this area see
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 39-41 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
17. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 286 U.S. 213 (1967).
18. 108 U. PA. L. Rnv. 414 (1960) (analysis of federal decisions concerning the right
to speedy trial).
19. A discussion of the treatment of the right in state courts is contained in Note, supra
note 14.
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stitutional right to a speedy trial through a legislative determination of the
maximum delay tolerable in bringing an accused to trial. 20 Florida courts
have considered the right personal 21 and waivable by a failure to demand
trial,22 a lack of affirmative objection to delays, 23 or other actions inconsistent
with the right.24 Invoking alternative fundamental rights, however, has been

held not to constitute waiver or acquiescence in delay. 2
Traditionally, the requirement that an accused be discharged if not tried
within three terms of court 26 was held applicable to prosecution-created
delays27 and to those actions of a court affirmatively denying a prompt trial. 28
Passive court delay arising from congested court calendars, however, has not
been a subject of judicial concern. The absence of decisions bringing passive
court delay within the speedy trial statute appears attributable to: (1) a belief
that the statute required trial only in "due course" of court procedure,2 9
(2) a belief that crowded dockets were "good and sufficient reason" why a trial
could not be provided,3 0 (3) the discretion afforded a trial court,3' and (4) a
presumption that continuances were granted for good cause.3 2 Consequently, a
20. Fla. Stat. §915.01 (1969), as amended by FLA. STAT. §915.01 (Supp. 1970) (effective
Jan. 1, 1971). Nine other states (Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky,
Maryland, Nevada, Vermont) have no statutory provisions safeguarding the right to a speedy
trial. See Note, Justice Overdue-Speedy Trial for the PotentialDefendant, 5 STAN. L. REV.
95, 99 n.27 (1952). Courts in states having such statutes adopt varying views concerning the
relationship between the state and constitutional speedy trial provisions. Compare Feger v.
Fish, 106 Fla. 564, 143 So. 605 (1932) (statute considered a legislative definition of the constitutional right), with State v. Kuhnhausen, 201 Ore. 478, 506, 272 P.2d 225, 232 (1954) (statute not definitive of constitutional right, merely passed pursuant to it). See also State v.
Williams, 230 So. 2d 185, 187 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970); State ex rel. Bird v. Stedman, 223
So. 2d 85, 86 (3d D.C.A. Fa. 1969).
21. State ex rel. Gayle v. Dowling, 91 Fla. 236, 107 So. 267 (1926).
22. Kelly v. State ex rel. Morgan, 54 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 1951) accord, e.g., Pickle v.
Bliss, 418 P.2d 69 (Crim. App. Okla. 1966) (stating the majority view). Contra State v.
Crosby, 217 Ore. 393, 542 P.2d 831 (1959) (accused has no obligation to demand trial).
23. Cacciatore v. State, 226 So. 2d 137, 139 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
24. State v. Williams, 73 So. 2d 295, 296 (Fla. 1954).
25. E.g., State ex rel. Johnson v. Edwards, 233 So. 2d 393, 395-96 (FLa. 1970) (motion
for change of venue). But see Buttler v State, 238 So. 2d 513 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (withdrawal of accused's waiver of jury trial held to constitute waiver of the right to a speedy

trial).
26. Fla. Stat. §915.01 (2) (1969), as amended by FLA. STAT. §915.01(2) (Supp. 1970)
(effective Jan. 1, 1971). A majority of states having speedy trial statutes measure time limitations by terms of court. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TTAL (Approved Draft 1968).
Other jurisdictions express limitations in more explicit terms (thereby avoiding inequities
created by varying lengths of court terms within a jurisdiction), e.g., ILz Rxv. STAT. ch. 38,
§10-5(b) (1970) (160 days from date of first demand); ID. R. CaM. P. 4(c) (not more
than one year when accused on recognizance).

27. State ex rel. Bird v. Stedman, 223 So. 2d 85 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969) (state barred
from reinstating information after nolle prosequt).
28. Feger v. Fish, 106 Fla. 564, 143 So. 605 (1932).
29. Cf. State ex rel. Gayle v. Dowling, 91 Fla. 236, 239, 107 So. 267, 269 (1926).
30. See Kelly v. State ex rel. Morgan, 54 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 1951).
31. Cf. State ex rel. Curley v. McGeachy, 149 Fla. 633, 642, 6 So. 2d 823, 827 (1942).
32. See Ex parte Warris, 28 Fla. 371, 373, 9 So. 718, 719 (1891).
o
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judicially created dichotomy between "acceptable" judicial delays and other
proscribed delays became the de facto rule in Florida, although such a distinction is not encompassed within the statute.
The first significant attack upon this rule was made in Dickey v. Circuit

Court, Gadson County38 when the Florida supreme court indicated that the
state must use all reasonable means to grant an accused a speedy trial.8 '
Subsequently, State ex rel. Johnson v. Edwardss held that only those delays
caused by the accused tolled the statute. However, by expressly exempting
delays "necessary to the ends of justice,"6 Edwards left ample room for
conjecture regarding the effects of congested court calendars.
The instant case clarifies Edwards and leaves no doubt that delays stemming from crowded dockets are not acceptable under the statute.8 7 Although

Florida courts are not subject to the extreme delays experienced in some
localities, 8 the instant decision destroys the prior unarticulated rule that
passive, court-created delays are excusable.3 9 As a result Florida is now in
accord with both a majority of jurisdictions having similar statutory provisions40 and the legal standards suggested by the American Bar Association.,"
By rejecting the lower court's view that demand for trial must be made
early in the term, 42 the court allowed the petitioner to occasion his demands
for trial so as to minimize the prosecution's awareness of his right to be discharged. 43 The statute required only that demand be made within the term."
33. 200 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1967).
34. Id. at 527-28 (dictum); accord, People v. Bryarly, 23 IMI. 2d 313, 319, 178 N.E2d
826, 329 (1961) (state has burden of utilizing all means available to provide accused a
speedy trial).
85. 238 So. 2d 893, 895 (Fla. 1970).
36. Id. at 896.
37. The instant decision also ratified two prior district court cases that held crowded
dockets not to toll the statute. Anderson v. Edwards, 234 So. 2d 720 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1970),
cert. denied, 238 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1970); Clark v. Edwards, 234 So. 2d 399 (4th D.C.A.
Fla. 1970).
88. See generally Waybright, Justice Without Delay, 42 FLA. B.J. 1133 (1968). Detailed
statistical summaries of the caseloads and disposition of cases in Florida's courts may be
found in JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLORiDA, FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 13-27 (1970). An example
of a court experiencing oppressive delays is the Criminal Court of Manhattan. One section
of that court is able to dispose of only 7.5% of its daily assignment of 154 cases. N. Y. Times,
Jan. 26, 1969, at 53, col. 61.
39. By statute, a few states expressly excuse delays stemming from crowded dockets.
E.g., Mo. Rxv. STAT. §545.900 (1959) (accused to be discharged unless there is a lack of
time to try case within the term); ARK. STAT. ANN. §43-1710 (1947) (no discharge where
judge fails to hold term of court or there is a lack of time).
40. Note, supra note 14, at 858-59. Where no "good cause" provision exists in statute,
the majority views discharge as mandatory in cases of court-created delay, e.g., State v.
Underwood, 130 W. Va. 166, 43 S.E.2d 61 (1947). States having a good cause provision use
varying approaches. See People v. Tahtinen, 50 Cal. 2d 127, 828 P.2d 442, cert. denied, 858
U.S. 853 (1958) (prosecution must justify good cause where congestion forces delay); State v.
Ellison, 209 Ore. 672, 807 P.2d 1050 (1957) (burden on accused to show court delay violates
good cause provision).
41. ABA, supra note 15, at 28.
42. State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, 229 So. 2d 595, 596 n.4 (8d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
43. 238 So. 2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1970).
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The court reasoned that the prosecution's affirmative duty to bring the
accused to trial was not met by ignoring his demands until the third and
final demand was made.4 5
Although the court in the instant case found the petitioner had neither
acquiesced in the delay nor waived the right to a speedy trial, the court did
recognize that under other circumstances these doctrines could preclude an
accused from being discharged under the statute. 8 The court's embrace of
the doctrines of acquiescence and waiver weakens what otherwise would
have been a more forceful opinion. A preferable course would be to "indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver,"' 7 and "not presume acquiescence

48
in the loss of fundamental rights."

The underlying bases for the doctrines of acquiescence and waiver,' 9
although not articulated by Florida courts, are that delays are welcomed by
and operate in favor of an accused,50 that the right to a speedy trial is personal
to the accused, 51 and that the right is relative to society's interests in protecting
itself from criminal offenders. 52 The soundness of these rationales is questionable. The emotional and financial burden of untried accusations cannot be
considered welcome.53 The possible loss of defense witnesses and the increasing
difficulty of obtaining evidence to refute the state's allegations cannot be
considered beneficial to an accused. ' Moreover, since waiver is "ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment of a known right 5 5 presuming acquiescence or
imposing an affirmative duty beyond that demanded by the statute seems inappropriate. The doctrine of waiver is especially inequitable when an accused,
through inadvertance, ignorance, lack of counsel, or incompetent counsel
is unaware of or unable to assert his right to a speedy trial.5 6 When dealing
with an accused's right to prompt trial the courts should look to substance, not
technical requirements of the law. 57 The speedy trial statute should be
liberally construed to give it the beneficial effect intended.s
44. FLA. STAT. §915.01 (2) (1969).
45. 238 So. 2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1970). See FLA. STAT. §915.01 (Supp. 1970), required that
demand for trial be made "on the first day of each of three (3) successive terms of court."
46. 238 So. 2d 281, 282 (Fla. 1970): "We agree... doctrines of waiver and acquiescence
are fully applicable to speedy trial cases."
47. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy to Use of Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
48. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
49. See generally Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476, 478-80 (1968)
(discussion of waiver).
50. United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1963).
51. F. Hamua, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSrrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

61 (1969).
52. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); State v. Fogg, 79 S.D. 576, 581,
115 N.W. 2d 889, 892 (1962).
53. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 49 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).

54. Id. at 37-38 (majority opinion).
55. Mason v. State, 176 So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. 1965) (deals with waiver of the right to
counsel).
56. See Loy v. Grayson, 99 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1957) (accused not entitled to discharge
after twenty-five terms of court due to his failure to demand trial).
57. Dickoff v. DewelI, 152 Fla. 240, 241, 9 So. 2d 804, 805 (1942).
58. State ex rel. Bird v. Stedman, 223 So. 2d 85, 86 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
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Although the court refused to obviate the doctrines of acquiescence and
waiver, the instant decision strengthens the right to a speedy trial by destroying the myth that court-created delays are somehow less oppressive than
delays emanating from other sources.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the instant decision is its potential
for promoting judicial reform. This potential stems from the foreseeable
political pressures created when accused criminals are discharged without
trial. Only increased efforts by the judicial, executive, and legislative branches
of government will allow the courts to fulfill the mandate of the instant
case and avoid adverse reaction to its possible consequences. The judicial
branch must strive to maximize utilization of existing facilities and personnel. In turn, the prosecution must meet its burden of promptly bringing an
accused to trial through increased prosecutorial diligence, productivity, and
efficiency. Finally, the legislature must support and adequately fund the
judiciary's attempts to streamline the administration of justice. By providing
the impetus for such actions the instant decision reaches towards the ultimate
objective of the right to a speedy trial: freeing an accused from "delays
manufactured by the ministers of justice.... ."51
WILLIAM

L.

EARL

59. Daniels v. United States, 17 F.2d 359, 344 (9th Cir. 1927).
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